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Year in Review Lecture 
Milena Sterio* 
Good morning! It is a pleasure to be here and share with you my 
thoughts on the topic of "Year in Review." As opposed to boring you 
with facts, graphs, statistics, and numbers, I have decided to focus 
on three of the most significant themes or cases in international 
humanitarian law over the past year. These include the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Al Mahdi case; the closing and legacy ofthe two 
ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR); and the ongoing conundrum with the situation in Syria. 
International Criminal Court Al Mahdi Case 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, also known as Abou Tourab, was a member 
of the radical Islamic group Ansar Eddine, a Malian armed jihadist 
group linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Al Mahdi 
served as head of the Islamic Police in Timbuktu and was one of 
the four commanders of Ansar Eddine during its brutal occupation 
of Timbuktu in 2012. During this time, Al Mahdi worked closely 
with the leaders of all the armed groups in the area, and, according 
to the allegations asserted against Al Mahdi, played an active role 
in the occupation of Timbuktu. 
How did the Al Mahdi case wind up before the ICC? The Malian 
government itself referred the situation in Mali to the Court in 
2012. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) then opened an official 
investigation into alleged crimes committed in Mali in January 2013, 
and in February 2013 the Malian government and the ICC signed a 
cooperation agreement in accordance with Section IX of the Rome 
Statute. On September 18, 2015, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an 
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arrest warrant against Al Mahdi. At this particular point in time, Al 
Mahdi was detained in a prison in Niger, and on September 26, 2015, 
he was transferred to ICC authorities by the government ofNiger. 
On March 24, 2016, charges against Al Mahdi, consisting of war 
crimes constituted by attacks against religious and cultural sites, 
were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber I. The ICC indicted Al Mahdi 
on several charges of war crimes, specifically intentional attacks 
against ten religious and historic buildings and monuments. Article 
8.2(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides that war crimes 
include "intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated 
to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not military objectives." All the buildings 
that Al Mahdi was charged with attacking had been under UNESCO 
protection, and most had been listed as world heritage sites. 
In addition to the ICC's charges against Al Mahdi, human rights 
groups accused Al Mahdi of other crimes and have encouraged the 
OTP to consider credible allegations of Al Mahdi's involvement in 
crimes committed against civilians, including rape, sexual slavery, 
and forced marriage. Al Mahdi indicated that he would plead guilty 
on March 1, 2016; his trial opened on August 22, 2016, and concluded 
within a single week. The Court sentenced Al Mahdi to nine years of 
imprisonment on September 27, 2016. 
In the most recent development on August 17, 2017, Trial Chamber 
VIII of the ICC issued a Reparations Order in the Al Mahdi case, 
concluding that Al Mahdi is liable for 2.7 million euros in expenses for 
individual and collective reparations for the community of Timbuktu 
for intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic 
buildings in that city. Noting that Al Mahdi is indigent, the Chamber 
encouraged the Trust Funds for Victims (TFV) to complement 
the reparations award and directed the TFV to submit a draft 
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implementation plan for February 16, 2018. The Chamber highlighted 
the importance of cultural heritage and stressed that, because of their 
purpose and symbolism, most cultural property and cultural heritage 
sites are unique and ofsentimental value. Their destruction thus carries 
a message of terror and helplessness, destroys part of humanity's 
shared memory and collective consciousness, and renders humanity 
unable to transmit its values and knowledge to future generations. 
While some have applauded the ICC prosecution of Al Mahdi as a 
victory for the institution and as a ground breaking legal precedent, 
others have criticized the court's decision to go after a relatively little­
known defendant, for a relatively insignificant crime. 
Commentators have applauded the Al Mahdi case and called it a big 
victory for the ICC. Let me briefly summarize some of the main 
arguments in favor of the Al Mahdi case as a victory for the ICC. 
First, Al-Mahdi's trial was short and efficient, which is important for a 
Court that has been hobbled by inexcusably long proceedings. The ICC 
has a small budget, and completing an efficient trial without expending 
many resources represents an important legal accomplishment for the 
Court and will arguably free up the ICC to pursue other cases and 
alleged criminals. Al Mahdi is the first ever defendant in the ICC 
to plead guilty. From the start of his case, he promised to cooperate 
with the ICC-in exchange, perhaps, for a lenient sentence. Thus, 
prosecuting Al Mahdi, while knowing in advance that the defendant 
would plead guilty and cooperate with prosecutors, and also perhaps 
provide information about other future cases, would appear to have 
been a particularly efficient use of the ICC's limited resources. 
Second, the ICC has been perceived as a largely inefficient institution 
as cases against other alleged criminals have languished. Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir has been free since becoming the first 
person charged by the ICC for genocide. Joseph Kony, the notorious 
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leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, continues to wreak havoc 
in Central Africa, ten years after being indicted. The trials of 
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William 
Ruto collapsed as a result of a lethal combination of shoddy case 
construction by ICC prosecutors and Kenyan political interference. 
According to some, securing a conviction against an Islamic terrorist 
such as Al Mahdi will send the right message that the ICC is efficient 
and capable of arresting individuals and successfully completing 
trials within a reasonable time period. 
Third, Al Mahdi's surrender to the ICC was accomplished through 
the cooperation of both Niger and Mali, two African states. This 
cooperation may help the ICC to counter criticism of bias against 
the African continent and the perception that African states are 
somehow against the institution. 
Fourth, Al Mahdi's evidence and testimony could be of use during 
future prosecutions; as I already mentioned, he has proven to be more 
than willing to cooperate with ICC investigators and prosecutors. Al 
Mahdi may have been targeted by the ICC because of this promise, as 
the ICC may have believed that Al Mahdi's cooperation and eventual 
testimony would potentially help in bringing other perpetrators 
in Mali to account. As one commentator observed, "If al-Mahdi 
provides solid testimony and evidence of other crimes, he could 
emerge as an extremely useful resource not only for the ICC but for 
accountability in Mali more generally." This possibility may also help 
to alleviate the skeptics' concern that the ICC should not be focusing 
on the destruction of property, but should instead focus on violence 
committed against populations and individuals. 
Fifth, Al Mahdi's conviction may bolster the Court's image as 
a relevant institution seen as prosecuting crimes that shock the 
conscience of mankind, such as the destruction of UNESCO sites. 
Because of its limited jurisdictional reach, the ICC has been unable 
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to prosecute individuals responsible for the destruction of cultural 
sites in places such as Palmyra or Bamiyan. Securing a conviction 
against an individual accused of similar destruction in an ICC 
member state, where the court does have jurisdiction, signals that the 
destruction of cultural heritage is a war crime of legitimate concern 
to the international community. 
In other words, the ICC showed that accountability for cultural 
crimes is possible. The Court's action also signaled other shifts. Most 
crucially, the Court tapped into global outrage about the destruction 
of cultural heritage sites. While the Court has no jurisdiction in 
Syria or Iraq, where Islamic State fighters have wantonly obliterated 
historic sites, it could do something about the destruction ofTimbuktu 
shrines. In prosecuting Al Mahdi, the ICC joined with UNESCO to 
form a new front line against the violent destruction of culture. 
While many have pointed out the limitations ofthe Al Mahdi precedent 
in terms of deterring future war criminals tempted to destroy other 
cultural sites, the AlMahdi case does demonstrate that the international 
community cares about the protection of buildings and monuments 
and is willing to expend focus and energy on this issue. 
Sixth, the Al Mahdi case is a "first" of many kinds. This case marks 
the first time that the destruction of cultural sites has been prosecuted 
as a war crime at the ICC. It is also the first time that an Islamic 
radical has been prosecuted at the ICC. Finally, it is the first time that 
an ICC defendant has pleaded guilty. 
Critics have pointed out that the case may not be such a welcome 
development in international criminal law. For example, scholars 
have criticized the Al Mahdi case as stretching the limits ofthe ICC to 
a breaking point because the case fails to respect two core principles 
of the ICC: gravity and complementarity. 
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First, gravity. 
The ICC was established to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for 
the most serious crimes of international concern. Article 17(l)(d) of 
the Rome Statute provides that a case is inadmissible before the ICC 
if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court. The Prosecutor has stated in the context of the Al Mahdi case 
that "attacks against religious buildings are so grave that they warrant 
action by the international community." One has to wonder, however, 
whether the destruction of buildings should qualify as one of the most 
serious crimes of international concern. In another recent case, the so­
called Flotilla incident, where Israeli special forces killed ten activists 
on board a vessel that had been about to breach the Israeli naval 
blockade of Gaza, the ICC OTP defined the principle of gravity as: 
(i) whether the individuals or groups of persons that are likely 
to be the object of an investigation, include those who may bear 
the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes committed; and 
(ii) the gravity of the crimes committed within the incidents 
which are likely to be the focus of an investigation. 
Subsequently, the OTP defined the elements that are to be taken into 
account when assessing the gravity of the crimes, namely, the "scale, 
nature, manner of commission of the crimes and their impact." 
With this precedent in mind, it is important to address two questions: 
whether Al Mahdi bears the greatest responsibility for the alleged 
crimes, and whether the crimes themselves are of sufficient gravity. 
First, it is unclear whether Al Mahdi is indeed the most responsible 
for the crimes. While it is likely that he had been involved in the 
destruction of the religious buildings, it is equally likely that other 
members of the Islamic groups were similarly involved in the 
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planning and commission of these crimes. It has been suggested that 
Al Mahdi is on trial because all of the other leaders of the various 
extremist militia groups that operated in the region have been killed 
or otherwise escaped. This suggestion would indicate that Al Mahdi 
was selected for prosecution for pragmatic reasons, which had little to 
do with the gravity principle. 
Second, it is uncertain whether the war crime ofdestruction ofcultural 
property is grave enough to warrant prosecution at the ICC. Despite 
the Rome Statute's prohibitions against the destruction of religious 
buildings, one must assume that the drafters envisaged that these 
crimes would only be prosecuted once committed in combination with 
other crimes that qualify as a war crime. For example, in the current 
trial of Bosco Ntaganda, the defendant is facing twelve war crimes 
charges and five charges of crimes against humanity, in addition to 
the destruction of cultural and religious property. 
Thus, the Ntaganda case seems to pass the gravity threshold more 
easily than the Al Mahdi case. Although the destruction of cultural 
and religious buildings may constitute an attack on humanity as a 
whole, as recent ISIS-perpetrated attacks on the cultural heritage 
of Syria may demonstrate, this does not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that the ICC should prosecute the perpetrators. The 
gravity threshold imposes a limitation on the Court: in light of its 
limited resources, the Court should focus on the prosecution of those 
most responsible for serious crimes. It may be argued that Al Mahdi's 
alleged crimes are not grave enough. 
Second, complementarity. 
It is questionable whether the Al Mahdi prosecution satisfies the 
principle of complementarity. The ICC is not supposed to interfere 
with national prosecutions, and the Court should only prosecute 
suspects if a state is not able or willing to prosecute. According to 
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Article 17(l)(a) of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible when it 
is being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the state is genuinely unwilling or unable to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution. In other words, if a state is able 
and willing to prosecute an individual, that state should be given the 
opportunity to do so, and the ICC should step away. 
Al Mahdi had already been indicted on terrorism charges in Niger 
before the ICC issued its arrest warrant. When Niger was informed 
that the ICC wanted to prosecute Al Mahdi, Nigerois authorities 
transferred Al Mahdi and relinquished jurisdiction over the case. 
Niger never stated that it was unwilling or unable to prosecute Al 
Mahdi, and the ICC authorities themselves never bothered with 
the complementarity issue. Thus, it seems that the ICC decision to 
prosecute al Mahdi is contrary to the complementarity principle, and, 
in light ofthe fact that the case may not pass the gravity threshold, one 
has to wonder whether Al Mahdi's prosecution should have remained 
in the hands of Niger authorities. 
While the Al Mahdi case may be applauded as a precedent-setting 
victory for the ICC as an institution and for international criminal 
law in general, the case can also be criticized as an improper use of 
the Court and of its limited resources to prosecute a lesser-known 
defendant for relatively insignificant crimes. The case remains 
relevant, however, for another reason: it demonstrates that the ICC 
may function properly if cases are carefully selected and referring 
states actively cooperate in the defendant's arrest and prosecution. It 
may be better for the ICC to pursue lesser-known defendants if the 
OTP determines that a conviction can likely be secured with limited 
resources, than to issue arrest warrants against defendants who are 
unlikely to find their way to The Hague. Limited justice may be 
better than no justice at all. 
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Closing and Legacy of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
As all of you know, the Rwanda tribunal officially closed, having 
completed all of its trial and appellate-level work, at the end of 2015. 
The ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is 
also coming to a close. The Yugoslavia Tribunal is currently finishing 
its last trial in the Mladic case Uudgment is expected in November 
2017). In the last appellate case, Prlic et al., the appellate judgment is 
also expected in November 2017. Remaining proceedings in the cases 
ofKaradiic, Sdelj, and Stanisic & Simatovic are under the jurisdiction 
of the so-called Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. 
The Mechanism has been mandated to perform a number of essential 
functions previously carried out by the ICTY and the ICTR and has 
assumed responsibility for, inter alia, the enforcement of sentences, 
administrative review, assignment of cases, review proceedings, 
appeal proceedings, contempt, requests for revocation of the referral 
of cases to national jurisdictions, the variation of witness protection 
measures, access to materials, disclosure, changes in classification 
of documents, and requests for compensation and assignment of 
counsel. In carrying out these multiple functions, the Mechanism 
maintains the legacies of these two pioneering ad hoc international 
criminal courts and strives to reflect best practices in the field of 
international criminal justice. 
With the closing of these ad hoc tribunals, an important chapter in 
international criminal law has come to an end. The ICTY and the 
ICTR played crucial roles in the development ofinternational criminal 
law four decades post-Nuremberg. They reignited the development of 
this field oflaw, and their case law contributed toward the fine-tuning 
of complex legal doctrines, such as genocide, superior or command 
responsibility, the definition of international armed conflict, the 
prosecution of crimes of sexual violence, and many others. What are 
the legacies of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals? 
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In the context ofinternational criminal tribunals, scholars have defined 
"legacy" to mean a lasting impact, most notably on bolstering the 
rule of law in a particular society by conducting effective trials while 
also strengthening domestic capacity to do so. Legacy, in this context, 
implies the extent to which a particular court has had a significant 
effect by modeling best practices in handling the individual cases 
and compiling a historical record of the conflict. Legacy also means 
laying the groundwork for future efforts to prevent a recurrence 
of crimes by offering precedents for legal reform, building faith in 
judicial processes, and promoting greater civic engagement on issues 
of accountability and justice. This type of legacy is supposed to be 
long lasting and continue to have an impact even after the work 
of the tribunal is completed. 
A 2008 United Nations High Commissioner's Report on maximizing 
the legacy ofhybrid courts asserted that the need for such tribunals to 
leave a legacy is firmly accepted as part of United Nations' policy. In 
addition to the above view of legal legacy and impact, tribunals can 
have other types of roles that can meaningfully affect the pursuit of 
justice and human rights. Professors Kimi King and James Meernik 
have described the core missions of the ICTY's mandate (to bring 
to justice those responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law) as follows: (1) developing the Tribunals' functional 
and institutional capacities; (2) interpreting, applying, and developing 
international humanitarian and criminal law; (3) attending to and 
interacting with the various stakeholders who have vested interests; 
and (4) promoting deterrence and fostering peace-building to prevent 
future aggression and conflict. 
This framework is also applicable to the ICTR, as this Tribunal 
was charged with the same mandate as the ICTY, with the addition 
of promoting national reconciliation in Rwanda. In light of the 
above, "legacy" can be defined more broadly as the enduring 
influence of the Tribunals' work and processes on the ideals, 
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conceptions, and instrumentalities of international criminal 
law, justice, and human rights. 
Thus, while the Tribunals' legacy is equally important in the 
development of domestic justice and human rights more broadly, the 
focus of my remarks today is on the field of international criminal 
law (ICL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). What is the 
significance, impact, and legacy of the ad hoc tribunals through this 
particular lens? It is my hope that the legacy of ad hoc tribunals in 
the fields of ICL and IHL will be of particular assistance to those 
who work with the International Criminal Court (ICC), as much 
of the ad hoc tribunals' case law has served and will serve as 
important precedent within the ICC, and as the ICC will most likely 
continue to enhance the same IHL principles and doctrines that the 
ad hoc tribunals have developed. 
First, the ad hoc tribunals have contributed to the 
development of ICL by successfully charging and convicting 
defendants of genocidal offenses. 
The Rwanda Tribunal in the Akayesu case became the first 
international tribunal to enter a judgment for genocide, as well as 
the first to interpret the definition of genocide set forth in the 1948 
Geneva Conventions. In the Kambanda case, also before the Rwanda 
Tribunal, the defendant pied guilty to genocide, marking the first time 
in the history ofICL that an accused person admitted responsibility 
for genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. By accepting this 
guilty plea in the Kambanda case, the Rwanda Tribunal became the 
first international tribunal since Nuremberg to issue a judgment against 
a former head of state. In another case (Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and 
Ngeze), the Rwanda Tribunal convicted members of the Rwandan 
media by holding them responsible for broadcasts intended to inflame 
the public to commit acts of genocide. 
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The Yugoslavia Tribunal was the first international criminal tribunal 
to enter a genocide conviction in Europe. In April 2004, in the case 
against Radislav Krstic, the Appeals Chamber determined that 
genocide was committed in Srebrenica in 1995, through the execution 
ofmore than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys following the take­
over of the town by Bosnian Serb forces. Several other completed 
ICTY cases relating to the Srebrenica events have ensured that the 
genocide has been well documented and, in the words of ICTY 
President Theodor Meron, "consigned to infamy." 
According to the appellate judgment in the Krstic case, "Those who 
devise and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the 
manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions 
provide. This is a crime against all humankind, its harm being felt not 
only by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity." 
In sum, the ad hoc tribunals have significantly contributed to the 
prosecution of the crime of genocide and toward the notion that 
genocide is a crime against all that will never again be tolerated 
by the international community. 
Second, the ad hoc tribunals have contributed to the development of 
ICL and IHL by developing case law on crimes ofsexual violence and 
by focusing on specific gender issues. In theAki:ryesu case, the Rwanda 
Tribunal for the first time defined the crime of rape in international 
criminal law and recognized rape as a means ofperpetrating genocide. 
The Rwanda Tribunal created a special unit for gender issues and 
assistance to victims of genocide, choosing to focus on gender issues 
and to provide support and care to the victims of genocide. In this 
manner, the tribunals have, in addition to developing case law on 
crimes of sexual violence, created a participatory legacy-the idea 
that victims of serious crimes have a voice within international 
criminal prosecutions of such crimes. This idea, for better or for 
worse, is squarely present within the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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The Yugoslavia Tribunal has also played a historic role in the 
prosecution of wartime sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia 
and has paved the way for a more robust adjudication of such 
crimes worldwide. From the first days of the Tribunal's mandate, 
investigations were conducted into reports of systematic detention 
and rape of women, men, and children. More than a third of those 
convicted by the ICTY have been found guilty of crimes involving 
sexual violence. Such convictions are one ofthe Tribunal's pioneering 
achievements. They have ensured that treaties and conventions that 
have existed on paper throughout the 20th Century have finally been 
put in practice, and violations have been punished. 
The ICTY took groundbreaking steps to respond to the imperative of 
prosecuting wartime sexual violence. Together with its sister tribunal 
for Rwanda, the Tribunal was among the first courts of its kind to 
bring explicit charges ofwartime sexual violence, and to define gender 
crimes such as rape and sexual enslavement under customary law. 
The ICTY was also the first international criminal tribunal to enter 
convictions for rape as a form of torture and for sexual enslavement 
as crime against humanity, as well as the first international tribunal 
based in Europe to pass convictions for rape as a crime against 
humanity, following a previous case adjudicated by the ICTR. The 
ICTY proved that effective prosecution of wartime sexual violence is 
feasible and provided a platform for the survivors to talk about their 
suffering. That ultimately helped to break the silence and the culture 
of impunity surrounding these terrible acts. In addition, the ICTY 
established a robust Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS), which 
provided the witnesses with assistance prior to, during and after their 
testimony, ranging from practical issues to psychological counseling 
during their stay in The Hague. In this manner, the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal, like the Rwanda Tribunal, has contributed significantly 
to the legacy of developing and prosecuting gender-specific crimes 
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and crimes of sexual violence, and to ensuring meaningful victim 
participation in the adjudication process. 
Third, both ad hoc tribunals have contributed toward the development 
of the doctrine of superior responsibility by holding that superior 
responsibility applies to civilians in leadership positions and that it 
is not confined to purely military leaders. This contribution by the ad 
hoc tribunals is particularly relevant in light of modern-day warfare 
where conflicts are often fought outside ofwell-defined militaries and 
where orders and policies are often crafted by non-military leaders. 
Fourth, the ad hoc tribunals have established a legacy of cooperation 
and impact on domestic jurisdictions between international tribunals 
and national authorities. Multiple countries have signed agreements 
on the enforcement of Rwanda Tribunal's sentences (Mali, Benin, 
France, Italy, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, and Sweden). These 
agreements illustrate the important role national authorities play in 
ensuring that those convicted of serious violations of international 
law serve their sentences in compliance with international detention 
standards. In addition, the Rwanda Tribunal upheld the first referral of 
an international criminal indictment to Rwandan national authorities 
for trial, in the case against Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi. A total of eight 
ICTR cases have now been referred to Rwanda. Two additional cases 
have been referred to France for trial. Monitoring in all referred cases 
is presently being conducted by the Mechanism. 
Throughout its existence, the ICTY OTP has worked closely with the 
new states and territories that emerged from the former Yugoslavia 
on their domestic prosecutions. In the aftermath of the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), returning displaced persons and refugees 
voiced fears about arbitrary arrests on suspicion of war crimes. To 
protect against this, the OTP agreed to operate a "Rules of the Road" 
scheme under which local prosecutors were obliged to submit case 
files to The Hague for review. The Rules of the Road procedure, 
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established under the Rome Agreement of February 18, 1996, 
regulated the arrest and indictment of alleged perpetrators of war 
crimes by national authorities. 
As part of the Tribunal's contribution to the reestablishment of 
peace and security in the region, the ICTY prosecutor agreed to 
provide an independent review of all local war crimes cases. If a 
person was already indicted by the OTP, he could be arrested by 
the national police. If the national police wished to make an arrest 
where there was no prior indictment, they had to send their evidence 
to the OTP. Under the Rome Agreement, decisions of the OTP 
became binding on local prosecutors. 
To ensure as many persons as possible suspected of war crimes are 
brought to justice, the OTP has provided assistance to national bodies 
in the region by passing on evidence that may be of use in local 
investigations and by transferring whole cases for prosecution locally. 
A dedicated transition team within the OTP was tasked with handing 
over to national courts cases involving intermediate- and lower­
ranking accused. Such cases have included case files of suspects 
investigated by the OTP but where no indictments were ever issued, 
resulting in the referral of some files with investigative material to 
authorities in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, which have then pursued 
these cases. Secondly, despite indictments issued by the ICTY, a 
total of eight cases involving thirteen accused have been referred to 
courts in the former Yugoslavia, mostly to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
pursuant to Rule l lbis ofthe Rules ofProcedure and Evidence. On the 
basis of an ICTY indictment and the supporting evidence provided by 
the Tribunal's prosecution, these cases are then tried in accordance 
with the national laws of the state in question. 
Finally, the OTP has promoted regional cooperation among national 
prosecutors. The ICTY prosecution strongly supports efforts to 
enhance cooperation in criminal matters between states of the former 
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Yugoslavia, as it is an essential step towards rebuilding trust and justice 
in the region. Successful trials before national courts require that 
prosecutors in neighboring countries can collaborate in the collection 
of evidence and securing witnesses. OTP officials have taken part in 
several regional meetings, facilitating the creation of good working 
relationships between the prosecutors in the different states. 
Thus, the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals have created a significant 
legacy of cooperation with national authorities and have developed 
specific models of cooperation that have contributed toward the 
rebuilding of national justice systems. 
Fifth, the ad hoc tribunals have created a significant legacy in 
the operational sense by establishing specific case management 
strategies for the prosecution of complex international crimes and by 
establishing particular evidentiary procedures resulting in the long­
term preservation of evidence that will enable national jurisdictions 
to prosecute additional cases in the future. For example, the Rwanda 
Tribunal held special deposition proceedings in the case concerning 
Felicien Kabuga to preserve evidence for use at trial once he is 
arrested. Similar proceedings were later held in the cases of two other 
fugitives: Augustin Bizimana and Protais Mpiranya. By holding 
these proceedings, the ICTR is ensuring that the passage oftime does 
not jeopardize the international community's ability to bring these 
suspects to trial when they are finally apprehended. 
The ICTY has also established specific evidentiary standards 
regarding victims of crimes of sexual violence, by allowing them to 
testify anonymously-witnesses have been able to testify under a 
pseudonym, with face and voice distortion in video feeds, or in closed 
session. Through the development of its rules of procedure, the ICTY 
has also sought to protect the victims of sexual violence from abusive 
lines of questioning during testimony. The ad hoc tribunals have thus 
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left behind an operational legacy, which will undoubtedly serve as a 
model for future international criminal prosecutions. 
The Ongoing Situation in Syria 
The last theme of my remarks focuses on Syria-both in terms of 
the recent United States' use of force against the Assad leadership, 
as well as in terms of creating an accountability mechanism 
for crimes committed in Syria. 
Back in 2013, President Obama drew a "red line" and threatened that 
the United States would use force against the Syrian regime in the 
wake of the latter's use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. 
Obama ultimately decided against using force in Syria, but President 
Trump reversed this decision and launched several air strikes against 
Syrian President Assad's forces in 2017. President Trump offered the 
following justification for the United States air strikes against Syria: 
(1) That it was in the vital national security interest ofthe United States 
to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons; 
(2) that Syria used banned chemical weapons, violated its obligations 
under the Chemical Weapons Convention and ignored the urging of 
the UN Security Council; and (3) that the refugee crisis continued 
to deepen and the region continued to destabilize, threatening the 
United States and its allies. 
Most international law experts would agree that the United States' use 
of force in Syria this year is illegal. As we all know, international law 
allows the use of force in two limited situations: pursuant to Security 
Council authorization and/or in self-defense. No particular Security 
Council resolution has authorized the use of force in Syria, and it is 
very difficult for the United States, located thousands of miles away, 
to claim that it has somehow been threatened by the Assad regime 
and that it must act in self-defense. 
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The United States' use of force in Syria is significant however for 
another reason: this intervention can be analyzed from a different 
standpoint-that it may be acceptable (while not legal) for states 
to act outside the framework of the UN Charter when deemed 
necessary or when pursuing a "legitimate aim." Many of you may 
remember that this was the argument used to justify the NATO air 
strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. In 2013, 
the U.K. Prime Minister's Office argued, in the wake of the ongoing 
Syrian crisis, that a state could take exceptional measures in order 
to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe 
in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical 
weapons by the Syrian regime. 
According to this argument, such a legal basis is available, under 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided that a set of 
conditions is met. These conditions require that (1) there is "convincing 
evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a 
whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring 
immediate and urgent relief''; (2) it is "objectively clear that there is 
no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be save"; 
and (3) the force used is "necessary and proportionate to the aim of 
relief of humanitarian need." 
The U.S. military action in Syria has resurrected debates regarding 
the humanitarian intervention exception to the general international 
law ban on the use of force. As of today, most of us would agree that 
humanitarian intervention has not become a norm of positive law. 
Moreover, in the Syrian context, it appears that American air strikes 
have not contributed toward a broader humanitarian mission and cannot 
be easily interpreted as constituting part of a larger humanitarian 
operation. Thus, the humanitarian intervention exception does not 
provide an easy legal basis for the American use offorce against Syria. 
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The Syrian situation however underscores and highlights the 
limitations of international law. Many states in the international 
community have reacted to the U.S. actions in Syria with approval; 
such approval may reflect a political understanding for this course of 
action chosen by the Unites States in the face ofthe crimes committed, 
rather than legal acquiescence. The U.S. military action in Syria does 
not constitute the first time that the prohibition on the use of force has 
been violated and not sanctioned by the international community. 
However, this should not necessarily mean that the legitimacy of 
the UN Charter is diminished. Instead, the U.S. military action in 
Syria highlights the limits of international law and its inherent tie 
to international relations and geopolitics: the UN Security Council, 
the only international law body authorized to officially "bless" the 
use of force against a sovereign state, is often blocked and unable 
to take legal action, thus resulting in a unilateral use of force by the 
United States in an illegal yet perhaps legitimate manner. The obvious 
risk that such unilateral military action creates is that although the 
attack may be seen as morally or ethically legitimate, it nonetheless 
results in acts committed outside the purview of international law. 
This dangerously opens the door to using force under possible false 
pretenses in the future. Of course, the same false pretenses could be 
pursued within the boundaries of the existing legal framework, but at 
least the law acts as a barrier in limiting the recourse to force in such 
situations. In sum, the U.S. intervention in Syria has sparked new 
debates regarding the limits of international law and regarding the 
utility and appropriateness of the humanitarian law exception. 
Another important consequence of the U.S. military action in Syria 
relates to the law applicable to this conflict. Until recently, there 
was a conflict between ISIS and the Assad regime together with a 
conflict between the U.S. (and the international coalition) and ISIS, 
which both qualified as non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). 
The U.S. attack against Syria could transform the conflict into an 
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international armed conflict (IAC) between the United States and 
Syria, meaning that a different and more extensive set of rules will 
apply. Depending on the position adopted, this could lead to either the 
internationalization of the entire conflict in Syria, meaning that there 
would be an IAC between all the actors (including ISIS) or that there 
would be a situation of mixed conflicts, an IAC between the United 
States and Syria and an NIAC for all the other actors, which in turn 
would lead to different applicable rules. 
Finally, the Syrian situation has resulted in an ongoing debate within 
our professional circles regarding the best accountability mechanism 
to address violations of ICL and IHL committed in Syria. While all 
agree that those responsible for such violations should face justice, 
many disagree as to which form of justice-international, hybrid, 
or domestic. The ICC, because of its jurisdictional limitations, is of 
limited use in Syria. A new Syria tribunal could be established either 
pursuant to a true international model, similar to the Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda tribunals, or pursuant to a hybrid model, similar to 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Lebanese Tribunal. Or, 
accountability could be imposed through domestic justice, assuming 
that the Syrian leadership is reformed and able and willing to meet the 
demands of accountability. To conclude, Syria may, sadly, preoccupy 
our legal minds for years to come. 
Other than the A/Mahdi conviction, the international law themes ofthe 
past year that I have addressed here today have not been happy. This 
conclusion, however, does not diminish the role of international law 
and, in particular, of international lawyers, in matters of international 
justice. I encourage all of us to continue our hard work in the field of 
international humanitarian law and to continue to contribute toward 
the development of this area of the law. 
